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Abstract—We propose a new real-world attack against the
computer vision based systems of autonomous vehicles (AVs). Our
novel Sign Embedding attack exploits the concept of adversarial
examples to modify innocuous signs and advertisements in the
environment such that they are classified as the adversary’s
desired traffic sign with high confidence. Our attack greatly
expands the scope of the threat posed to AVs since adversaries are
no longer restricted to just modifying existing traffic signs as in
previous work. Our attack pipeline generates adversarial samples
which are robust to the environmental conditions and noisy image
transformations present in the physical world. We ensure this
by including a variety of possible image transformations in the
optimization problem used to generate adversarial samples. We
verify the robustness of the adversarial samples by printing them
out and carrying out drive-by tests simulating the conditions
under which image capture would occur in a real-world scenario.
We experimented with physical attack samples for different
distances, lighting conditions and camera angles. In addition,
extensive evaluations were carried out in the virtual setting for
a variety of image transformations. The adversarial samples
generated using our method have adversarial success rates in
excess of 95% in the physical as well as virtual settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ubiquity of machine learning (ML) provides adversaries
with both opportunities and incentives to develop strategic
approaches to fool learning systems and achieve their mali-
cious goals. A number of powerful attacks on the test phase
of ML systems used for classification have been developed
over the past few years, including attacks on Support Vector
Machines and deep neural networks [1], [2], [3], [4], [5].
These attacks work by adding carefully crafted perturbations
to benign examples to generate adversarial examples. In the
case of image data, these perturbations are typically imper-
ceptible to humans. While these attacks are interesting from a
theoretical perspective and expose gaps in our understanding
of the working of neural networks, their practical importance
remains unclear. The main question to be addressed is “What
is the nature and extent of the attacks that can be carried out
on real-world ML systems?’.
Arguably, one of the most important upcoming applications
of ML is for autonomous vehicles (AVs) [6], [7]. Since the
computer vision systems of current and future AVs are likely to
be based on neural networks [8], [9], the existence of physical
world attacks on neural networks would represent a significant
threat. However, the attacks on virtual systems listed above do
(a) Benign logo. Classified as
’bicycles crossing’ with confi-
dence of 0.59.
(b) Adversarial logo. Classified
as ’Stop’ with confidence of 1.0.
Fig. 1. Sign Embedding attack examples. The benign image on the left is
rejected as a false positive detection by our traffic sign recognition pipeline
since it has a low confidence. In contrast, the adversarial image on the right
is accepted since it is classified with high confidence.
not translate directly to the real world. This occurs because the
optimization problems solved to generate virtual adversarial
examples do not account for varying physical conditions which
may include brightness, orientation and distance variation,
camera artifacts, shadows, reflections and the loss of detail
from image resizing. Evtimov et al. [10] have performed a
preliminary investigation of this threat by accounting for some
of these factors while creating physical adversarial examples
starting from traffic signs.
In this paper, we greatly expand the scope of the threat
adversarial examples pose to AVs by proposing new attacks to
generate physically robust adversarial samples from innocuous
signs as shown in Figure 1. We evaluate the real-world
viability of these adversarial examples by setting up a realistic
evaluation pipeline shown in Figure 2. The full version of
this paper [11] with further details on the methodology and
the experiments is available. The code and data required
to reproduce our results is available at https://github.com/
inspire-group/advml-traffic-sign.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) We propose a new real-world attack on traffic sign recog-
nition systems: the Sign Embedding attack modifies
innocuous signs such that they are classified as traffic
signs. Our attack pipeline creates adversarial examples
which are effective even in a real-world setting.
2) We propose and examine an end-to-end pipeline for
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creating adversarial samples that fool sign recognition
systems and are resilient to noisy transformations of the
image that may occur during the image capture phase.
3) We carry out an extensive evaluation of our attacks in
both physical as well as virtual settings over various
sets of parameters. In the virtual setting, our attack
has a 99.07% success rate without randomized image
transformations at test time and 95.50% with. We also
conduct a real-world drive-by test, where we attach a
video camera to a car’s dashboard and extract frames
from the video for classification as we drive by (Figure
4). The Sign Embedding attack has a success rate of over
95% in this setting, where the success rate is the number
of frames in which the adversarial image is classified as
the target divided by the total number of frames.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Machine learning systems typically have two phases, a
training phase and a test phase [12]. Our focus is on attacks
during the test phase, which are typically known as evasion
attacks. These have been demonstrated in the virtual setting for
a number of classifiers [13], [14], [4], [5]. These attacks aim
to modify benign examples by adding a perturbation to them
such that the modified examples are adversarial, i.e. they are
misclassified by the ML system. In the case of attacks on the
computer vision systems of AVs, the goal of the adversary
is to generate signs that appear benign to humans but are
misclassified by the traffic sign recognition system.
Threat model: We consider the commonly used white-box
threat model [5], [10] for the generation of adversarial exam-
ples against deep neural networks. In the white-box setting, we
assume that the adversary has complete access to the traffic
sign recognition model including its architecture and weights.
Further, we focus on the creation of targeted adversarial
samples, since these are more relevant to an adversary aiming
to misclassify traffic signs.
Virtual adversarial samples: To generate a targeted adversar-
ial sample x˜ starting from a benign sample x for a classifier f ,
the following optimization problem [5] leads to state-of-the-art
attack success in the virtual setting:
min d(x˜,x) + λ`f (x˜, T ), (1)
s.t. x˜ ∈ C.
Here, `f (·, ·) is the loss function of the classifier, d is an
appropriate distance metric, T is the target class and C is the
constraint on the input space. The method described above
produces adversarial examples which do not work well under
the variety of conditions encountered in the real world. In
light of this, there has been some work towards generating
physically robust adversarial samples by Athalye et al. [15]
and Evtimov et al. [10]. In this paper, we offer a refinement
of their methods by incorporating the logit-based objective
function and change of variables proposed by Carlini and
Wagner [5] in the virtual setting.
Traffic sign detection and classification: Our traffic sign
recognition pipeline consists of two stages: detection and clas-
sification. We utilize a commonly used recognition pipeline
based on the Hough transform [16], [17], [18]. The shape-
based detector uses circle Hough transform [19] to identify
the regions of a video frame that contain a circular traffic
sign. Before using Hough transform, we smooth a video frame
with a Gaussian filter and then extract only the edges with
Canny edge detection [20]. Triangular signs can be detected
by a similar method described in [17]. The detected image
patch is cropped and passed on to the neural network classifier
to determine whether it is a traffic sign and assign its label.
Images classified with a low confidence score are discarded
as false positives for detection.
The German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB)
[21] is used to train and test the classifier. Our classifier
is based on a multi-scale CNN [22] and trained on a data-
augmented training set generated by random perspective trans-
formations [23] as well as random brightness and color adjust-
ment of the original training data. The classifier’s accuracy on
GTSRB validation set is 98.5%.
III. ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES FOR SIGN RECOGNITION
In this section, we introduce Sign Embedding attacks,
which modify innocuous signs that are not even part of the
training set such that they are detected and classified with high
confidence as potentially dangerous traffic signs.
A. Sign Embedding attacks
We propose a novel attack based on the concept of adver-
sarial examples by exploiting the fact that the shape-based de-
tection part of the traffic sign recognition pipeline can pick up
a circular object that may not be a traffic sign. Under ordinary
conditions when no adversarial samples are present, the false
detection does not unduly affect the traffic sign recognition
system due to the following reasons; i) The confidence scores
corresponding to the predicted labels of these objects are low;
ii) These circular objects are not consistently classified as a
certain sign. The predicted label changes as the background
and the viewing angle varies across multiple frames in the
video. Therefore, a traffic sign recognition system can choose
to treat any detection with these two properties as an erroneous
detection by setting the confidence threshold close to 1 and/or
ignoring objects that are inconsistently classified. However,
adversarial examples generated from these benign circular
objects using our optimization are classified consistently as
target traffic signs with high confidence under varying physical
conditions. We demonstrate these observations experimentally
in Section III-A2.
1) Attack pipeline: Our pipeline has three steps (Figure 2):
Step 1. Obtain the original image x and choose target class
T that the adversarial example x˜ should be classified as.
Step 2. Generate the digital version of the physically robust
adversarial example as follows:
1. Generate mask M for the original image (A mask is
needed to ensure that the adversary’s perturbation budget is
not utilized in adding perturbations to the background.)
Fig. 2. Attack pipeline. This diagram provides an overview of the process by which adversarial examples are generated for the Sign Embedding attack as
well as for adversarial traffic signs.
Fig. 3. Frequency of the top-3 labels the given images are classified as under 100 different randomized transformations. The numbers on the right
of the plot are the average confidence corresponding to those labels. (a) shows original samples. (b) shows real traffic signs of the target class. (c) shows the
attacks generated from samples in (a).
2. Resize both the original image and and the mask to the
input size of the target classifier (32× 32 pixels in our case).
3. Run the optimization from Equation 2 to obtain the
perturbation δ.
4. Re-size the output perturbation δ and add it to the original
image.
Step 3. Test and print the generated adversarial signs.
Optimization problem: Our adversarial example genera-
tion method involves heuristically solving a non-convex opti-
mization problem using the Adam optimizer [24]. The problem
set-up is adapted from a general concept of expectation over
transformation [15]. An updating gradient is averaged over a
batch of randomly transformed versions of the original image
[25], [10]. The robust adversarial example can be written as
a solution to the minimization problem given below for any
input x:
min
δ∈Rn
c · 1
B
B∑
i=1
[F (τi(x+M · δ))] + max(‖δ‖p, L) (2)
where F (x) = max(maxj 6=T {Z(x)j} − Z(x)t,−K) is the
objective function from Carlini-Wagner’s L2 attack [5] and
Z(x)j is the j-th logit (layer before softmax) of the target
network. τi : Rn → Rn is a transformation function mapping
within the image space (n = 32 × 32 × 3). M is a mask or
a matrix of zeros and ones with the same width and height
as the input image, and M · δ is an element-wise product of
the mask and the perturbation to constrain the feasible region
to the sign area. The objective value is penalized by a p-
norm of the perturbation δ in order to keep the adversarial
perturbation unnoticeable by humans, and the constant c is
adjusted accordingly to balance between the real objective
function and the penalty term. The constant K determines the
desired objective value and thus, controls confidence score of
the adversarial example. We introduce an additional constant
L to explicitly encourage the norm of the perturbation to be at
least L since overly small perturbations can disappear in the
process of printing and video capturing.
Image transformations: For our experiments, the transforma-
tion function is comprised of (1) perspective transforms, (2)
brightness adjustment and (3) resampling (or image resizing).
The three transformations (with randomized parameters) are
chosen to simulate the varying real-world conditions in which
photos of the adversarial sign might be taken. Perspective
transformation covers all projections of a 3D object onto a
plane. Thus, it can express common 2D image transformations,
such as rotation and shearing.
Using our attack pipeline, the adversary is free to disguise
adversarial examples as ad signs, drawings, graffiti etc. Here,
we demonstrate two possible settings in which adversarial
examples can be embedded: (1) Logo and (2) Custom Sign.
Logo attack: In this attack, images of commonly found logos
are modified such that they are detected and classified with
high confidence as traffic signs (Figure 3(1.a) and (1.c)). Since
these logos are omnipresent, they allow an adversary to carry
out attacks in a large variety of settings. In this scenario, the
problem setup (objective and constraints) is exactly the same
as Equation 2.
Custom Sign attack: In this attack, the adversary creates
a custom sign that is adversarial starting from a blank sign
(Figure 3(2.a) and (2.c)). This allows the adversary to create
adversarial signs in almost any imaginable setting by using
a mask to create images or text that are appropriate for the
surroundings. In this attack, the original sign is a solid color
circular sign and the norm of the perturbation is not penalized
by the optimization problem but only constrained by the shape
of the mask. This allows the adversary to draw almost any
desired shape on a blank sign and the optimization will try
to fill out the shape with colors that make the sign classified
as the target class. This attack can also be carried out by the
same optimization problem by setting c and L to some large
numbers so that the optimization will focus on minimizing the
losses without penalizing the norm of the perturbation.
2) Experimental validation of claims: To confirm our ear-
lier hypotheses with regard to the confidence of classification
for signs out of the training set, we apply random transfor-
mations to create 100 images for each of the logo signs.
Figure 3(1.a) shows that the logo signs are classified as
different classes depending on the transformation and with low
confidence on average. As a comparison, Figure 3(b) shows
that real traffic signs (one of the 43 labels) are consistently
classified as the correct label with probability very close to 1.
Some successful Logo attacks are displayed in Figure 3(1.c).
The adversarial signs are classified as their corresponding tar-
get label (shown in Figure 3(1.b)) with high confidence. This
way, the adversary can expect the desired misclassification
with much higher probability and consistency. The embedded
adversarial signs are more likely to be recognized by our
system as a real traffic sign compared to their original signs
because (1) they are classified with a high confidence score
and (2) their classified labels are consistent across all frames
of the input video. Similarly, in Figure 3(2.c), the Custom Sign
attack produces adversarial signs that contain the shape of the
mask filled with various colors. Again, under 100 different
randomized transformations, the signs are mostly classified as
the target class with high probability.
Remarks: Our attacks can be created starting from any
sign such that they are classified with high confidence as a
potentially dangerous traffic sign. Benign signs do not have
this effect since they are usually classified with low confidence.
(a) Logo attack: classified as a ’No
passing’ sign with a confidence of 1.0
(b) Custom Sign attack: ”Hello,
World” classified as a ’Stop’ sign
with a confidence of 1.0
Fig. 4. Sample video frames taken during the drive-by tests
B. Adversarial traffic signs
Images of traffic signs themselves may be modified to be
adversarial, an approach which was followed by Evtimov et
al [10]. Here, we show that our method can also be used to
generate adversarial traffic signs. Our pipeline requires only
a single image of a traffic sign, instead of a large number of
photos of the target sign taken at different angles and lighting
conditions as required by Evtimov et al. [10].
Evaluation in virtual setting: Using the proposed method,
we evaluate our adversarial signs along with those generated
by Carlini-Wagner (CW) method on a random subset of 1000
traffic signs chosen from the testing data of GTSRB. Our
attack achieves an attack success rate of 99.07% as compared
to 96.38% for the CW attack. Further, our attack has a much
lower deterioration rate of 3.6% compared to 89.75% for the
CW attack. The deterioration rate is the fraction of adversarial
examples that are no longer adversarial after random image
transformations are applied to them.
C. Real-world attacks
To demonstrate that the effectiveness of our adversarial
traffic signs in the real world, we carried out drive-by tests
(shown in Figure 4) on two samples from each of our attacks
(adversarial traffic signs, Logo, and Custom Sign). Each sam-
ple is re-sized to 30×30 inches and printed on a high-quality
poster. The printed signs are stuck on a pole. A GoPro HERO5
was mounted behind the car’s windshield to take videos of
2704×1520 pixels at 30 frames per second. Starting around 80
feet from the sign, the car approached it with an approximate
speed of 10 mph. One of every five frames is directly passed
to the traffic sign recognition pipeline (a combination of a
shape-based detector and a CNN classifier). For the adversarial
traffic sign, 95.74% of the detected frames are classified as the
adversary’s target label, 56.60% for Logo attack, and 95.24%
for the Custom Sign attack.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have shown in this paper that the extent of the danger
posed by adversarial samples to AVs is more than was pre-
viously explored by expanding the attack surface available to
an adversary. Finding defenses against our attacks will spur
research on creating ML systems that do not provide overly
confident predictions on adversarial inputs. We plan to explore
these defenses in future work.
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